{"id":786,"date":"2022-09-11T21:34:09","date_gmt":"2022-09-11T21:34:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.allendowney.com\/blog\/?p=786"},"modified":"2022-09-11T23:24:37","modified_gmt":"2022-09-11T23:24:37","slug":"polarization-and-partisan-sorting","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.allendowney.com\/blog\/2022\/09\/11\/polarization-and-partisan-sorting\/","title":{"rendered":"Polarization and partisan sorting"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

I\u2019m working on a book called Probably Overthinking It<\/em> that is about using evidence and reason to answer questions and guide decision making. If you would like to get an occasional update about the book, please join my mailing list<\/a>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In the previous article<\/a>, I used data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to show that polarization on an individual level has increased since the 1970s, but not by very much. I identified fifteen survey questions that distinguish conservatives and liberals; for each respondent, I estimated the number of conservative responses they would give to these questions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the 1970s, the average number of conservative responses had decreased consistently. The spread of the distribution has increased slightly, but if we quantify the spread as a mean absolute difference<\/a>, here’s what it means: in 1986, if you chose two people at random and asked them the fifteen questions, they would differ on 3.4 questions, on average. If you repeated the experiment in 2016, they would differ by 3.6. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is not a substantial change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But even without polarization at the individual level, there can be polarization at the level of political parties. So that’s what this article is about.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here’s an overview of the results:<\/p>\n\n\n\n