Have the Nones Leveled Off?

Have the Nones Leveled Off?

Last month Ryan Burge published “The Nones Have Hit a Ceiling“, using data from the 2023 Cooperative Election Study to show that the increase in the number of Americans with no religious affiliation has hit a plateau. Comparing the number of Atheists, Agnostics, and “Nothing in Particular” between 2020 and 2023, he found that “the share of non-religious Americans has stopped rising in any meaningful way.”

When I read that, I was frustrated that the HERI Freshman Survey had not published new data since 2019. I’ve been following the rise of the “Nones” in that dataset since one of my first blog articles.

As you might guess, the Freshman Survey reports data from incoming college students. Of course, college students are not a representative sample of the U.S. population, and as rates of college attendance have increased, they represent a different slice of the population over time. Nevertheless, surveying young adults over a long interval provides an early view of trends in the general population.

Well, I have good news! I got a notification today that HERI has published data tables for the 2020 through 2023 surveys. They are in PDF, so I had to do some manual data entry, but I have results!

Religious preference

Among other questions, the Freshman Survey asks students to select their “current religious preference” from a list of seventeen common religions, “Other religion,” “Atheist”, “Agnostic”, or “None.”  

The options “Atheist” and “Agnostic” were added in 2015.  For consistency over time, I compare the “Nones” from previous years with the sum of “None”, “Atheist” and “Agnostic” since 2015.

The following figure shows the fraction of Nones from 1969, when the question was added, to 2023, the most recent data available.

The blue line shows data until 2015; the orange line shows data from 2015 through 2019. The gray line shows a quadratic fit.  The light gray region shows a 95% predictive interval.

The quadratic model continues to fit the data well and the recent trend is still increasing, but if you look at only the last few data points, there is some evidence that the rate of increase is slowing.

But not for women

Now here’s where things get interesting. Until recently, female students have been consistently more religious than male students. But that might be changing. The following figure shows the percentages of Nones for male and female students (with a missing point in 2018, when this breakdown was not available).

Since 2019, the percentage of Nones has increased for women and decreased for men, and it looks like women may now be less religious. So the apparent slowdown in the overall trend might be a mix of opposite trends in the two groups.

The following graph shows the gender gap over time, that is, the difference in percentages of male and female students with no religious affiliation.

The gap was essentially unchanged from 1990 to 2020. But in the last three years it has changed drastically. It now falls outside the predictive range based on past data, which suggests a change this large would be unlikely by chance.

Similarly with attendance at religious services, the gender gap has closed and possibly reversed.

UPDATE: Ryan Burge looked at the gender gap in CES and GSS data and found similar results: especially among young people, the gender gap has either disappeared or crossed over. And Ryan pointed me to this article by Dan Cox and Kelsey Eyre Hammond which reports similar trends in data from the Survey Center on American Life.

Attendance

The survey also asks students how often they “attended a religious service” in the last year. The choices are “Frequently,” “Occasionally,” and “Not at all.” Respondents are instructed to select “Occasionally” if they attended one or more times, so a wedding or a funeral would do it.

The following figure shows the fraction of students who reported any religious attendance in the last year, starting in 1968. I discarded a data point from 1966 that seems unlikely to be correct.

There is a clear dip in 2021, likely due to the pandemic, but the last two data points have returned to the long-term trend.

Data Source

The data reported here are available from the HERI publications page. Since I entered the data manually from PDF documents, it’s possible I have made errors.

Should divorce be more difficult?

Should divorce be more difficult?

“The Christian right is coming for divorce next,” according to this recent Vox article, and “Some conservatives want to make it a lot harder to dissolve a marriage.”

As always when I read an article like this, I want to see data — and the General Social Survey has just the data I need. Since 1974, they have asked a representative sample of the U.S. population, “Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now?” with the options to respond “Easier”, “More difficult”, or “Stay as is”.

Here’s how the responses have changed over time:

Since the 1990s, the percentage saying divorce should be more difficult has dropped from about 50% to about 30%. [The last data point, in 2022, may not be reliable. Due to disruptions during the COVID pandemic, the GSS changed some elements of their survey process — in the 2021 and 2022 data, responses to several questions have deviated from long-term trends in ways that might not reflect real changes in opinion.]

If we break down the results by political alignment, we can see whether these changes are driven by liberals, conservatives, or both.

Not surprisingly, conservatives are more likely than liberals to believe that divorce should be more difficult, by a margin of about 20 percentage points. But the percentages have declined in all groups — and fallen below 50% even among self-described conservatives.

As the Vox article documents, conservatives in several states have proposed legislation to make divorce more difficult. Based on the data, these proposals are likely to be unpopular.

To see my analysis, you can run this notebook on Colab. For similar analysis of other topics, see Chapter 11 of Probably Overthinking It.

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It’s another installment in Data Q&A: Answering the real questions with Python. Previous installments are available from the Data Q&A landing page.

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Logarithms and Heteroskedasticity

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Combining Risks

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Bertrand’s Boxes

Bertrand’s Boxes

An early draft of Probably Overthinking It included two chapters about probability. I still think they are interesting, but the other chapters are really about data, and the examples in these chapters are more like brain teasers — so I’ve saved them for another book. Here’s an excerpt from the chapter on Bayes theorem.

In 1889 Joseph Bertrand posed and solved one of the oldest paradoxes in probability. But his solution is not quite correct – it is right for the wrong reason.

The original statement of the problem is in his Calcul des probabilités (Gauthier-Villars, 1889). As a testament to the availability of information in the 21st century, I found a scanned copy of the book online and pasted a screenshot into an online OCR server. Then I pasted the French text into an online translation service. Here is the result, which I edited lightly for clarity:

Three boxes are identical in appearance. Each has two drawers, each drawer contains a medal. The medals in the first box are gold; those in the second box, silver; the third box contains a gold medal and a silver medal.

We choose a box; what is the probability of finding, in its drawers, a gold coin and a silver coin?

Three cases are possible and they are equally likely because the three chests are identical in appearance. Only one case is favorable. The probability is 1/3.

Having chosen a box, we open a drawer. Whatever medal one finds there, only two cases are possible. The drawer that remains closed may contain a medal whose metal may or may not differ from that of the first. Of these two cases, only one is in favor of the box whose parts are different. The probability of having got hold of this set is therefore 1/2.

How can it be, however, that it will be enough to open a drawer to change the probability and raise it from 1/3 to 1/2? The reasoning cannot be correct. Indeed, it is not.

After opening the first drawer, two cases remain possible. Of these two cases, only one is favorable, this is true, but the two cases do not have the same likelihood.

If the coin we saw is gold, the other may be silver, but we would be better off betting that it is gold.

Suppose, to show the obvious, that instead of three boxes we have three hundred. One hundred contain two gold medals, one hundred and two silver medals and one hundred one gold and one silver. In each box we open a drawer, we see therefore three hundred medals. A hundred of them are in gold and a hundred in silver, that is certain; the hundred others are doubtful, they belong to boxes whose parts are not alike: chance will regulate the number.

We must expect, when opening the three hundred drawers, to see less than two hundred gold coins the probability that the first that appears belongs to one of the hundred boxes of which the other coin is in gold is therefore greater than 1/2.

Now let me translate the paradox one more time to make the apparent contradiction clearer, and then we will resolve it.

Suppose we choose a random box, open a random drawer, and find a gold medal. What is the probability that the other drawer contains a silver medal? Bertrand offers two answers, and an argument for each:

  • Only one of the three boxes is mixed, so the probability that we chose it is 1/3.
  • When we see the gold coin, we can rule out the two-silver box. There are only two boxes left, and one of them is mixed, so the probability we chose it is 1/2.

As with so many questions in probability, we can use Bayes theorem to resolve the confusion. Initially the boxes are equally likely, so the prior probability for the mixed box is 1/3.

When we open the drawer and see a gold medal, we get some information about which box we chose. So let’s think about the likelihood of this outcome in each case:

  • If we chose the box with two gold medals, the likelihood of finding a gold medal is 100%.
  • If we chose the box with two silver medals, the likelihood is 0%.
  • And if we chose the box with one of each, the likelihood is 50%.

Putting these numbers into a Bayes table, here is the result:

PriorLikelihoodProductPosterior
Two gold1/311/32/3
Two silver1/3000
Mixed1/31/21/61/3

The posterior probability of the mixed box is 1/3. So the first argument is correct. Initially, the probability of choosing the mixed box is 1/3 – opening a drawer and seeing a gold coin does not change it. And the Bayesian update tells us why: if there are two gold coins, rather than one, we are twice as likely to see a gold coin.

The second argument is wrong because it fails to take into account this difference in likelihood. It’s true that there are only two boxes left, but it is not true that they are equally likely. This error is analogous to the base rate fallacy, which is the error we make if we only consider the likelihoods and ignore the prior probabilities. Here, the second argument is wrong because it commits the a “likelihood fallacy” – considering only the prior probabilities and ignoring the likelihoods.

Right for the wrong reason

Bertrand’s resolution of the paradox is correct in the sense that he gets the right answer in this case. But his argument is not valid in general. He asks, “How can it be, however, that it will be enough to open a drawer to change the probability…”, implying that it is impossible in principle.

But opening the drawer does change the probabilities of the other two boxes. Having seen a gold coin, we rule out the two-silver box and increase the probability of the two-gold box. So I don’t think we can dismiss the possibility that opening the drawer could change the probability of the mixed box. It just happens, in this case, that it does not.

Let’s consider a variation of the problem where there are three drawers in each box: the first box contains three gold medals, the second contains three silver, and the third contains two gold and one silver.

In that case the likelihood of seeing a gold coin is each case is 1, 0, and 2/3, respectively. And here’s what the update looks like:

PriorLikelihoodProductPosterior
Three gold1/311/33/5
Three silver1/3000
Two gold, one silver1/32/32/92/5

Now the posterior probability of the mixed box is 2/5, which is higher than the prior probability, which was 1/3. In this example, opening the drawer provides evidence that changes the probabilities of all three boxes.

I think there are two lessons we can learn from this example. The first is, don’t be too quick to assume that all cases are equally likely. The second is that new information can change probabilities in ways that are not obvious. The key is to think about the likelihoods.

Estimation with Small Samples

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Destructive Testing

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